Operational Details of Coups d'Etat

Most discussion of coups d’etat is had at a very high level: “the military storms the radio station and declares themselves the new government”. Like a documentary on drug manufacturing skipping a few steps so as not to give out dangerous information, popular media on coups usually omits the on-the-ground, tactical element of coups - which is the only part that really matters. This is a shame because if we don’t understand the mechanics of coups d’etat at a technical level, we can’t analyze with clear eyes the risk of coups or the likelihood of success of a coup in progress. For purely academic reasons, I’ve developed a fairly actionable understanding of how coups work, and you may find it interesting.

The nature of a coup d’etat

Coups are possible because political authority is separate from the machinery of the state. The state itself is not a political entity, it is a bureaucratic machine of org charts and reporting lines. It turns orders into action as surely as a meshing gear transmits rotational motion. The average general, intelligence officer, and state media employee cares much more about their paycheck than politics.

In a normal situation, political authority is determined by a constitution. In a coup, some actor attempts to non-constitutionally usurp authority from the existing powers, the regime. State employees have political leanings, and many of them will feel loyalty towards the regime, but even in moments of constitutional crisis the average state functionary will continue to follow instructions from their superior - or at least, will wait and see how things play out.

A coup is like a hack. An initial point of access is leveraged to escalate access and take control of the whole system. A conspiracy grows within the state and then suddenly reveals itself, using its limited control of state power to neutralize any element of society that might oppose them. They say “we are the new political authority”, and if no force can concentrate resistance against this claim within 24 hours or so, then the plotters evidently are the de facto sovereign authority. State functionaries will continue following procedures and cashing their paychecks as normal, but at the top of the chain of command will be a new set of leaders. In the following months, the authority of this new leadership will be legitimized de jure.

The conspiracy germinates

A coup starts with informal conversations between close friends who trust each other to share their most subversive ideas. At some point, these conversations turn towards action, and the men begin approaching other friends to feel out their mood and assess the feasibility of a coup. A natural leader will be found in this group, based on his reputation and charisma.

The nucleus of conspiracy is usually found within the military. This is partly because the security apparatus has the capability to physically control people and places with force, which is essential for a coup. We typically imagine ambitious generals smoking cigars and licking their lips at the idea of taking power. This happens sometimes, but usually they’re responding to a crisis within the established authority and hesitantly considering whether they have to step in. Because the military is usually fairly independent of the rest of the government, often they’re the only responsible actors left standing when internal political tensions escalate out of control. Napoleon said: “I found the crown of France lying in the gutter, and I picked it up with my sword”.

During a coup, most of the action will take place in the country’s capital, so the most valuable conspirators are those who are positioned nearby. Unexplained troop movement towards the capital will set off alarms. Air, naval, and artillery forces are rarely relevant to the tactical objectives of the plotters, and using them signals desperation. Forces at a high state of readiness, such as rapid crisis response units, are preferable to those that can’t be mobilized quickly, such as reserves. Units capable of operating highly independently are preferable. For example paratroopers require aircraft support and some highly technical units may be rendered ineffective by the defection of one or two key people. Also consider a unit’s cohesion and loyalty to their commander. Elite units tend to have greater cohesion. A unit’s size is more important than their training and firepower because the main tactical objective is controlling spaces and any fighting that takes place is likely to be brief. Soldiers only need to take with them what they’d need for a day of combat.

The plotters will attempt to recruit the commanders of tactically relevant units - getting their commitment to either take some sort of action such as to secure a target or to take no action to resist the coup once action begins. If the commander of a tactically relevant unit can’t be approached safely, it may be possible to recruit a lower ranking member of the unit to commit an act of sabotage. For example a communications officer could fake or effect a malfunction with their equipment, or someone could lock away the unit’s ammunition, disable their transportation, or get their comrades drunk on the appointed night.

If not all tactically-relevant units can be recruited or sabotaged, neutralizing them with force will be one of the highest priorities once action begins. In an ideal coup, no weapons are fired for the same reason a man caught unarmed can be captured without a fight. A plan that counts on combat is especially risky. If not enough of the tactically-relevant forces can be controlled, a coup may not be feasible. I would imagine that most coups are aborted in the planning stages.

Operational security during planning

When potential co-conspirators are approached, it’s important to communicate that the plot is already in its late stages, almost certain to succeed, and that the person’s involvement would be limited to a single small action or inaction. Participants must be compartmentalized into independent cells, with the full picture known only to the original plotters. A cell will only know what action they are to take and how they will be told to begin. Because they know nothing about the broader conspiracy, potential participants will decide whether or not to participate based entirely on their relationship with and opinion of the man who approached them, as well as their level of concern about the general political situation. If the man making the approach is a senior officer with a strong network, it can be inferred that the plot is likely large and formidable.

It’s impossible to plan a coup in total secrecy. As more people are approached, rumors will spread and make their way to the intelligence services. Any plot large enough to succeed will not remain completely secret. Just before the plan is activated, there may be a general feeling among officers that something is about to happen. It’s certain that intelligence services will pick up on indications that something is going on. The question is how much they learn and how seriously they take the threat. Because of the conspiracy’s cell structure, any single informant will not know how large or advanced the threat is. Intelligence services are known to let plots develop so that they can be infiltrated. The goal is for the plot to reach critical mass before the security apparatus realizes how serious the threat is and triggers a response.

Some preparations are noisier than others. Rumors and informants are one thing, but movements of troops and equipment are likely to set off alarms. For example many units don’t have a stock of ammunition at their barracks, and it will be necessary to transfer ammunition from central armouries to cooperating units. This is a very noisy action, and an excellent paper trail will be necessary to avoid suspicion.

Final planning

The hour of action is not appointed well ahead of time. The conspirators continually balance the gain to be had from continuing to grow the plot against the risk that the regime will move against them. At some point, the plotters will determine that the plot is likely to succeed but quickly losing secrecy, so the plan must go forward within a few days. If conspirators begin to be arrested before the plan is sprung, the co-conspirators will have to flee or else activate the plan and hope for the best.

Recruitment of new participants will continue up until and through zero hour. The most high-risk approaches will be made at the last minute, because even if these approachees immediately alert intelligence, it will take a few hours for the information to reach decision makers and for decision makers to activate a response.

The exact time at which tanks roll depends on tactical considerations. If circumstances provide a cover for troop movements, such as a military parade or civil unrest requiring military deployments, this could be opportune. Coups often occur when the head of state is out of the country or incapacitated because he is less able to respond to events. The most common day of the week for a coup is late Thursday night or early Friday morning because civilians can be told to stay home on Friday, then the plotters have the weekend to fully assert control, and normal life can return on Monday. This also prevents labor unions from using a general strike in protest against the coup - can’t strike on a weekend.

Action begins

As soon as unexpected troop movements are detected, the regime will activate plans to respond to a coup. Regime leadership will go into hiding, and they’ll move to secure or destroy military equipment, economic resources, and communications systems that may be of use to the plotters. Thus the action phase of the coup begins covertly, with the first priority being to capture these targets before the regime knows that a coup is underway.

The targets will be lightly defended so small teams with light infantry weapons should be sufficient. These teams will dress in civilian or police clothes. Key individuals will be captured in the very early morning as people are easier to locate at night and easier to take unaware. The detainees will be held in some secure area.

The particular circumstances of the situation determine which individuals are the highest priority. The key factors are whether the individual will be important for coordinating the government’s response and whether they could mobilize resistance to the coup such as by influencing fence-sitting units or by calling for street protests. Consider the head of state, cabinet ministers, military and intelligence leaders, political figures, student organizers, religious leaders, and labor leaders. For controlling communications, military communication channels are the highest priority, especially radio. Also consider TV stations and telephone exchanges. This will likely require technical expertise.

A complicating feature of the modern environment is the resiliency of communication infrastructure. Even in the most backwards banana republic it is no longer possible to cripple command and control or to dominate media by seizing a few facilities. But coups are still possible. In 2017, Saudi Arabia’s head of state was able to round up 500 elites on a Saturday night, quickly clearing the Ritz-Carlton hotel of guests to act as a holding area and grounding private jets to prevent flight. And the 2021 coup in Myanmar was successful despite an aftermath of weeks of protests amid periodic internet blackouts.

This is also the stage at which acts of sabotage against uncommitted units would be performed. These actions will be performed simultaneously by multiple teams.

The full force is committed – With key regime figures detained and communication infrastructure controlled, overt action begins. Larger units begin to move towards their targets.

At this stage, one would be very lucky to maintain surprise for long. Authors I’ve read say that troop departures will be timed so that they reach the capital simultaneously. I would guess that there are now systems that will detect when troops leave their base without authorization, so maybe it’s best for the coup’s forces to depart simultaneously.

The plotters will need a detailed understanding of the intelligence apparatus. If they know the regime’s security systems like a map, they can chart their course around its defenses. But there’s always an element of randomness, and any unexpected factor could be decisive. Napoleon said: “from success to failure is but a step. I have seen a trifle decide the most important issues in the gravest affairs.”

But even if the regime has advanced warning of troops moving toward the capital, they’ll be on the back foot. Key elements of their chain of command will be missing and their communications will be hampered, so lower-ranking individuals will have to take initiative. The nature and extent of the threat will be unclear, and an individual taking initiative will be cautious of overreacting. The reports coming in will be incomplete and somewhat inaccurate. There are some forces whose loyalty the regime knows it can count on, but the rest they won’t be sure of. At this stage, the plotters have the edge.

The plotters are ahead of the curve, but they face their own command challenges. A headquarters of key plotters creates a single point of failure for the conspiracy. The conspiracy’s top commanders likely want to be in the field with the troops who are loyal to them personally. This hampers situational awareness and communication. Overall command of coup forces will be difficult, so out of necessity, on-scene commanders will have to be given the liberty to use their own judgement.

Committed units will be assigned targets based on their capability and reliability. More reliable units will be assigned to higher priority tasks, keeping in mind each unit’s experience and firepower relative to the difficulty of each task. If the plotters’ force is large enough to cover all the priority targets, some force may be left over as a reserve to respond to unexpected situations or when some commitments inevitably fail to come through. Reserve forces can be positioned in public places to prevent street protest and as a show of force. In coups, perceptions are at least as important as material factors.

Asserting control

The first priority of this next action phase is to prevent regime reinforcements from arriving.

Only a small percent of the military is based near the capital, but a much larger percent of the military is able to reach the capital within 24 hours. It is possible to recruit or sabotage these forces (in fact the troops closer to the capital are generally the regime’s most politically reliable), but doing so is not necessary and would only compromise secrecy. Instead, coups seek to fully control the capital before reinforcements arrive. Fellow soldiers do not want to fight each other, and potential reinforcements are inclined to perceive the coup as a fait accompli. There’s less risk in doing nothing, ensuring that the coups succeedes, than in initiating combat, risking a prolonged war.

Now, the coup reveals itself. As the coup’s forces reach their positions, they’ll block major intersections around the city’s administrative center, creating a secure zone in which other teams can operate safely. To deter reinforcements and make escape more difficult, they’ll establish checkpoint on major roads to the capital. To deny reinforcements access to landing strips, park trucks on the runway and leave them guarded. If the country in question has paratroops, they will need to be recruited or sabotaged.

Inside the capital, teams are securing medium priority targets: the seat of political power, such as the head of state’s executive mansion, the legislature, or the party headquarters; the main administrative buildings such as the headquarters of the ministry of defense and intelligence; the treasury and major depository institutions, which have deposits of physical cash and gold; symbolic sites like monuments; public squares where demonstrations might be held; organizations capable of mobilizing “people power” like religious groups, political parties, and unions.

If an uncontrolled element of the military does try to resist the coup, the authors I’ve read suggest that the plotters concentrate their forces together and aim to quickly and decisively defeat them so as to deter further resistance. The coup will succeed or fail in the first few hours. If, after a few hours, key regime figures are still at large, the regime is still broadcasting on military or civilian communication channels, there is still fighting in the capital, or roads and runways into the capital are still accessible, then it is only a matter of time before the regime concentrates the force needed to beat back the coup and reassert control.

But if the plotters can control their targets for a few hours, reinforcements loyal to the regime will be deterred from intervening. The regime will have no resources to call upon and no ability to resist. It’s amazing to me that a regime can hold power for decades, then lose control for just 6 hours and never get it back. When separated from the instruments of power, a man is just a man.

Restoring order

The regime has now been dislodged from power, and the priority becomes to restabilize the situation. The coup severed the regime’s contact with its material sources of power, and now attaches itself to the wound and begins to fuse itself with the machinery of the state.

Although a new regime now has physical control, the old regime has many partners and stakeholders who must now be reassured that the situation is under control and normal life will resume as before.

The coup begins broadcasting on public channels a message something like this: “We have done a coup, and we have succeeded. We are in full control of the country. We have the full support of the military and it is not possible to oppose us. The president has resigned, and General Mauricio is the interim president. The current crisis forced us to act, and once the crisis is addressed there will be a return to normal constitutional procedure. Stay in your homes. Normal life will resume tomorrow.” It’s especially important that the people understand that the coup is not supported by foreign powers or an extremist faction.

A top priority is for the country’s new de facto power to get in communication with the bureaucracy and begin reestablishing the reporting lines that the old regime had. Their main message to key civil service officials is that the coup will not threaten their jobs and that the new regime does not intend to make significant changes to the military or civil service.

Lines of communication will need to be established with foreign governments, major companies operating in the country, and so on. With them, the message will be the same: the situation is stabilizing and you have nothing to worry about.

Once it’s clear that there will be no further resistance, the coup begins to return communication infrastructure to normal operation and draw down the military presence in the capital. There will be a concern that elements of the military that participated in the coup will now conspire against the original plotters to prevent them from attaining leadership. This is another reason the conspiracy’s cell structure is so important, it prevents a conspiracy within the conspiracy. These forces will be rewarded, sent away from the capital, and possibly their commanders will be reassigned to further reduce their threat.

Finally, the plotters will do what they can to give their new regime legitimacy. They may cajole the old regime into officially resigning and giving color of law to the transfer of power. They’ll want to conform as much as possible to existing constitutional procedures as they go about enacting their reforms and solidifying power. With each week and month that passes, the regime becomes more secure and more able to pursue more ambitious programs and reforms.